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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
RHEAD. HINDMARSH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
0. P. SKAGGS FOODLINER, 




STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by 
plaintiff in consequence of defendant's negligent mainte-
nance of its busine~ premises. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury which returned a verdict 
and judgment for plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the trial 
court affirmed. 
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2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agr·ees with appellant's statement of facts 
as set forth in appellant's brief, except that respondent does 
not agree that plaintiff stated in her deposition taken April 
14, 1967, that she saw the mound of snow and ice, on which 
she slipped, before her fall (R. 104-105). Plaintiff's lang-
uage in the deposition is susceptible of being understood as 
a statement that she was watching. generally where she 
was going without seeing specifically the mound of snow 




PLAINTIFF WAS NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEG-
LIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW: THiERE WAS ADE-
QUATE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY FIND-
ING OF NO CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
It is beyond dispute that the finding of a jury on the 
issue of contibutory negligence is entitled to the greatest 
respect and may not be set aside "unless the matter is so 
clear as to be free from doubt and reasonable minds would 
not differ thereon." DeWeese v. J. C. Penney Co., 5 Utah 
2d 116, 279 P.2d 898, 902 (1956); accord, Coombs v. Perry, 
2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P.2d 680 (1954). 
There is ample evidence in the record from which the 
jury could have found the following: 
1. Plaintiff did see and wa:s aware of the generally 
snow-covered condition of the parking lot (R. 194). 
2. Plaintiff did not see and was unaware of the par-
ticular hazard on which she slipped and fell-an irregular 
mound of ice variously described as from two to six inches 
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3 
thick and from five inches to two feet wide (R. 180-181, 
203-205). 
3. The mound of ice was snow-covered and tended 
to blend into the general background and to be indisting-
uishable therefrom except on close inspection (R. 181). 
4. The hazard of risk of injury from the concealed 
mound of ice was substantially greater than the risk of 
injury from the generally snow-covered condition of the 
parking lot. 
5. Plaintiff was only some three or four steps (eight 
feet) onto the snow-covered parking lot from ·the clear 
sidewalk when she fell (R. 197, 199). 
6. During the time it took to take those three or four 
steps, plaintiff was reasonably occupied in looking about 
for approaching traffic (R. 180-181, 195-97, 205). 
With reference to the foregoing facts, the decisions of 
this Honorable COurt establish the following applicable 
rules of law: _, 
1. Failure to see and avoid a plainly visibl¢ h<Wml ~ 
c0ntributory negligence as a matter of law. McAllister V; 
Bybee, 19 Utah 2d 40, 425 P.2d 778 (1967); Whitman v. 
W. T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 P.2d 918 (1964); Eis-
ner v. Salt Lake City, 120 Utah 675, 238 P.2d 416 (1951). 
2. However, a jury question exists as to contributory 
negligence where there is 
". * • * something which could be regarded as tending 
to distract the plaintiff's attention or to prevent him 
from seeing the danger, thus providing some reason-
abl~ basis for a finding that even though he exercised 
due care, he could be excused from seeing and avoid-
ing it." 
Whitman, supra, 395 P.2d 920. 
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3. Temporary giving of one's attention to another 
and distracting hazard is a defense to contributory neg-
ligence: 
"In the nature of things, one entering a store must give 
at least part of her attention to watching where she 
is going to a void other persons or obstacles. She ob-
viously is not required and likely in due care cannot, 
give her entire attention to any one hazard such as 
possible extraordinary slipperiness of the floor, which 
she has no particular reason to anticipate." 
De Wee-se, supra, 279 P.2d 902. 
4. The rule of McCallister, Whitman and Eisner is 
specifically distinguishable from those cases in which "the 
defect was concealed by snow." Eisner, supra, 238 P.2d 
417. 
It is clear from the facts and law as here stated that 
plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negli~. as. a 
matter of law because she was not aware of the particular 
hazard. There was adequate evidence from which the jury 
could conclude that plaintiff was excused from seeing and 
avoiding the mound of ice either (a) because in the exer-
cise of reasonable care and prudence she was momentarily 
occupied with avoiding the risk of injury from another 
source (automobile traffic) or (b) because the hazard was 
concealed by snow and was not visible in the exercise of 
reasonable care and prudence. 
The authorities cited by defendant to the contrary are 
distinguishable because in each of them either one or both 
of the3e factors (distraction or concealment) is missing. 
McCallister; Whitman; Eisner; supra 
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POINT ll 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT AND COULD NOT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW ASSUME THE RISK OF INJURY 
FROM A CONCEALED HAZARD. 
The relationship between the defenses of contributory 
negligence and assumption of risk has been articulated by 
!:.his Honorable Court as follows: 
"This further should be said in regard to the defense 
of assumption of risk. It is not identical with it but 
is closely related to contributory negligence. To in-
voke it and preclude recovery there must be a volun-
tary assumptim of the risk of a known danger where 
one has a reasonable opportunity to make an alter-
native choice." 
Evans v. Stuart, 17 Utah 2d 308, 410 P.2d 999, 1002 
(1966), accord, Johnson v. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d. 268, 
342 P.2d 884 (1959). 
Mere reason to know of the risk "in the exercise of 
ordinary care'' is insufficient to support the defense of as-
sumption of risk. Lewis v. County of Contra Costa,. 130 
Oal. App. 2d 176, 278 P.2d 756, 758 (1955). 
Thus it was held in Clay v. Dunford, 121Utah177, 239 
P.2d 1075 (1952) that instructions on assumption of risk 
constituted prejudicial error where plaintiff did not know 
of and voluntarily expose himself to the "specific· defooe' 
\\lhich caused his injuries. 239 P.2d 1076. 
Since plaintiff was unaware of the specific defect which 
caused her injuries (R. 180-181, 203-205), since she did 
not even have reason to know of the defect because it was 
conceal.2d by snow, she could not possibly have asswned 
the risk of injury therefrom. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT m 
TIIE JURY WAS ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED AS 
TO PLAINTIFF'S DUTY OF CARE FOR HER OWN 
SAF:ETY. 
It is a well established principle of law thart, in the 
absence of statute to the contrary, there are no "degrees" 
of care or negligence, that ". . . no more and no less 
than ordinary care under the circumstances of the case is 
required." 38 Am.Jur. 689, Negligence § 43 (1941). 
Citing Prosser as follows with respect to circwnstan-
ces of unusual danger: 
"What is required is merely the conduct of the reason-
able man of ordinary prudence under the circumstan-
ces, demanding a greater amount of care." 
the Court in Patterson v. Cushman, 394 P.2d 657, 6 A.L. 
R.3d 421, 430 (Alaska, 1946) then observed: 
"Under this view that there are no degrees of care as 
a matter of law and in the absence of any statute to 
the contrary, the trial judge need only instruct the 
jury that the defendant is required to exercise toward 
the plaintiff ordinary care under the circumstances." 
Patterson held that failure to instruct as to the pres-
ence of small children or the particular degree of care re-
quired under such circumstances was unobjectionable 
where general instructions had been given to the effect 
that 
"Negligence means the want of ordinary care; that is, 
the want of such care as an ordinarily reasonable and 
prudent person would exercise under like circumstan· 
ces." 6 A.L.R.3d 431; accord, Hughes v. MacDonald, 
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133 Cal App. 2d 74, 283 P.2J 360, 365 (1955); cf. Al-
varez v. Paulus, 8 Utah 2d 283, 333 P.2d 633, 634 
(1959). 
Such a general instruction was given in this case (In-
struction No. 6) and, as in Hughes, defendant's requested 
general instruction "would not have added anything of 
practical value" since the dangers of the "situation and 
the degree of care required must be clear to any juror and 
instructions could do little good." 283 P.2d 365. 
In short, defendant's argument on this point is hyper-
te-->Jmical and 'Without merit 
POINT IV 
1.lHE SCOPE OF DEFENDANT'S DUTY TO WARN 
PLAINTIFF OF EXISTING DANGER WAS CORRECT-
LY STATED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN ITS INSTRUC-
TION NO. 12. 
Defendant's argument with respect to Instruction No. 
12 misconceives the facts of this case. 
[)~fendant contends that the hazard was Obvious and 
that the Court should therefore have instructed to the 
effect that "there is no duty on the part of an owner to 
give a business visitor notice of an obvious danger,'' (de-
fendant's requested Instruction No. 35) rather than in-
structing, as it did, that "the employees of the defendant 
have a duty to warn the plaintiff of danger of which they 
are aware of which the plaintiff had no Imowledge." (In-
struction No. 12). 
The factual premise iS in error. As demonstrated 
above (see argument under Point I, supra), the particular 
hazard, the concealed mound of ice, was not obvious (R. 
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181). Its condition, however, indicated its existence in 
the parking lot for a sufficient length of time that defend-
ant, in the exercise of ordinary care, must have known of 
it and should either have removed it or warned plaintiff 
of the danger. 
Instruction 12 thus correctly stated the law as applied 
to the facts of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's entire argument on this appeal hinges on 
the erroneous factual premise that the particular hazard 
responsible for plaintiff's injury was the generally snowy 
condition of the parking lot rather than the mound of ice 
on which she slipped and fell. Since this is demonstrably 
not the case, plaintiff respectfully submits that the relief 
sought on appeal should be denied and the judgment of 
the trial court affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. REX LEWIS, for: 
HOW ARD AND LEWIS 
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